| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9009 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9009 |
| Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers | |
| Boyan Jovanovic; Serguey Braguinsky | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When a takeover is announced, the sum of the stock-market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet, upon news of a takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and, most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9009 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566618 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Boyan Jovanovic,Serguey Braguinsky. Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9009.pdf（351KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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