| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w9102
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 9102
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| Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking |
| Gary Gorton; Lixin Huang
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| 发表日期 | 2002-08-08
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| 出版年 | 2002
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with many small, undiversified banks, are prone to panics and failures, unlike systems with a few big banks that are heavily branched and well diversified. Systems of many small banks are more efficient if the banks form coalitions during times of crisis. We provide conditions under which the industrial organization of banking leads to incentive compatible state contingent bank coalition formation. Such coalitions issue money that is a kind of deposit insurance and examine and supervise banks. Bank coalitions of small banks, however, cannot replicate the efficiency of a system of big banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Financial Institutions
; Macroeconomics
; Monetary Policy
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9102
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566713
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gary Gorton,Lixin Huang. Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking. 2002.
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文件名：
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w9102.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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