| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w9114
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9114
|
| The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties |
| Suzanne Scotchmer
|
| 发表日期 | 2002-08-15
|
| 出版年 | 2002
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I address the positive question of when countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as domestic inventors, and how their incentive to do so depends on reciprocity. I also investigate an equilibrium in which regional policy makers choose IP policies that serve regional interests, conditional on each other's policies. I compare these policies with a notion of what is optimal, and argue that harmonization will involve stronger IP protection than independent choices. Harmonization can either enhance or reduce global welfare. Levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The more extensive protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy. |
| 主题 | International Economics
; Trade
; Industrial Organization
; Regulatory Economics
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9114
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566725
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Suzanne Scotchmer. The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties. 2002.
|
|
文件名：
|
w9114.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
