| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9154 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9154 |
| International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection | |
| Joshua Aizenman; Nancy P. Marion | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the international reserve-holding behavior of developing countries. It shows that political-economy considerations modify the optimal reserve level determined by efficiency criteria. A country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs and sovereign risk will want to accumulate international reserves as well as external debt. Efficiency considerations imply that reserves are optimal when the benefits they provide for intertemporal consumption and distortion smoothing equal the costs of acquiring them. However, a greater chance of opportunistic behavior by future policy makers reduces the demand for international reserves and increases external borrowing. Political corruption also reduces optimal reserve holdings. We provide some evidence to support these findings. Consequently, the debt-to-reserves ratio may be less useful as a vulnerability indicator. A version of the Lucas Critique suggests that if a high debt-to-reserves ratio is a symptom of opportunistic behavior, a policy recommendation to increase international reserve holdings may be welfare-reducing. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade ; International Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9154 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566766 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua Aizenman,Nancy P. Marion. International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9154.pdf（740KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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