| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9156 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9156 |
| The Market for Corporate Law | |
| Oren Bar-Gill; Michal Barzuza; Lucian Bebchuk | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. The analysis provides a full characterization of the equilibrium in this market. Competition among states is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect on managers' private benefits but not with respect to issues (such as takeover regulation) that substantially affect these private benefits. We analyze why a Dominant state such as Delaware can emerge, the prices that the dominant state will set and the profits it will make. We also analyze the roles played by legal infrastructure, network externalities, and the rules governing incorporations. The results of the model are consistent with, and can explain, existing empirical evidence; they also indicate that the performance of state competition cannot be evaluated on the basis of how incorporation in Delaware in the prevailing market equilibrium affects shareholder wealth. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9156 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566768 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oren Bar-Gill,Michal Barzuza,Lucian Bebchuk. The Market for Corporate Law. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9156.pdf（661KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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