| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9174 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9174 |
| Coordination, Fair Treatment and Inflation Persistence | |
| John C. Driscoll; Steinar Holden | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most wage-contracting models with rational expectations fail to replicate the persistence in inflation observed in the data. We argue that coordination problems and multiple equilibria are the keys to explaining inflation persistence. We develop a wage-contracting model in which workers are concerned about being treated fairly. This model generates a continuum of equilibria (consistent with a range for the rate of unemployment), where workers want to match the wage set by other workers. If workers' expectations are based on the past behavior of wage growth, these beliefs will be self-fulfilling and thus rational. Based on quarterly U.S. data over the period 1955-2000, we find evidence that inflation is more persistent between unemployment rates of 4.7 and 6.5 percent, than outside these bounds, as predicted by our model. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9174 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566786 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John C. Driscoll,Steinar Holden. Coordination, Fair Treatment and Inflation Persistence. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9174.pdf（292KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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