| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9186 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9186 |
| Why World Redistribution Fails | |
| Wojciech Kopczuk; Joel Slemrod; Shlomo Yitzhaki | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An optimal linear world income tax that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function provides a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast an optimal decentralized (i.e., within countries) redistribution has miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution. Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that countries such as the United States either place a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners or else expect that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes an implied weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy implicitly assumes either that essentially all transfers are wasted or places essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9186 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566798 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wojciech Kopczuk,Joel Slemrod,Shlomo Yitzhaki. Why World Redistribution Fails. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9186.pdf（428KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
