| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9323 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9323 |
| Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best? | |
| James R. Barth; Gerard Caprio, Jr.; Ross Levine | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-11-11 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and resources, (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii) regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government ownership. The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9323 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566939 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James R. Barth,Gerard Caprio, Jr.,Ross Levine. Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9323.pdf（676KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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