| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9334 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9334 |
| Why Europe Should Love Tax Competition - and the U.S. Even More So | |
| Eckhard Janeba; Guttorm Schjelderup | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-11-18 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Is global competition for mobile capital harmful (less public goods) or beneficial (less government waste)? This paper combines both aspects within a generalized version of the comparative public finance model (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000) by introducing multiple countries and endogenous tax bases. We consider the role of political institutions and compare parliamentary democracies (Europe) and presidential-congressional systems (USA) to show that increasing tax competition is likely to improve voter welfare, even if public good supply decreases because rents to politicians also fall. The conditions for voter welfare to improve are less stringent under the presidential-congressional system than under parliamentary democracies. Increasing tax competition lowers voter welfare if the only benefit to politicians is to divert resources from the government budget and the future is valued highly. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9334 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566950 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eckhard Janeba,Guttorm Schjelderup. Why Europe Should Love Tax Competition - and the U.S. Even More So. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9334.pdf（499KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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