| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w9503
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 9503
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| Taxation of Interest Income |
| Roger H. Gordon
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| 发表日期 | 2003-02-13
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Why is interest income taxed more heavily than other forms of capital income? This differential tax treatment has generated substantial tax arbitrage, resulting in lower tax revenue, efficiency costs, and apparently net gains to rich borrowers and net losses to poor lenders, together suggesting that this tax treatment makes no sense on welfare grounds. In examining this argument more formally, this paper reveals two omitted considerations that can help explain the existing tax treatment. First, the forecasted increase in the market interest rate results in a redistribution from rich borrowers to poor lenders. Yet this redistribution comes at no marginal efficiency cost, starting from a situation with no distortions to portfolio choice, so at the margin dominates further redistribution through the income tax. In addition, information about an individual's portfolio choice reveals information about her earnings ability, even controlling for observed labor income, if those who are more able tend to be less risk averse. By making use of this extra information about earnings ability, the tax system can be better tailored to redistribute from able to less able, for any given efficiency cost. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Taxation
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9503
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567114
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Roger H. Gordon. Taxation of Interest Income. 2003.
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文件名：
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w9503.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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