| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9678 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9678 |
| Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety | |
| Joshua Graff Zivin; Richard Just; David Zilberman | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-05-12 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the performance of liability rules in two-party stochastic externality problems where negotiations are feasible and side payments are based on the realized level of externalities. Results show that an increase in polluter liability does not necessarily increase safety or efficiency in cases where the polluter is risk neutral. Complete polluter liability is found to yield Pareto optimality. When either party is risk averse, an increase in polluter liability may sometimes reduce safety and efficiency. If the polluter is risk neutral and the victim is risk averse, Pareto optimality is only achieved by assigning full liability on the polluter, i.e. giving the victim complete property rights to a clean environment. If the polluter is risk averse and the victim is risk neutral, no level of polluter liability is optimal. In this case, optimality can only be achieved through a contract on abatement activities, such that the risk-averse polluter receives a guaranteed payment regardless of the stochastic outcome. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9678 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567302 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua Graff Zivin,Richard Just,David Zilberman. Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9678.pdf（280KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
