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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w9756 |
来源ID | Working Paper 9756 |
The Regulation of Labor | |
Simeon Djankov; Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silane; Andrei Shleifer; Juan Botero | |
发表日期 | 2003-06-09 |
出版年 | 2003 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment laws, collective bargaining laws, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that richer countries regulate labor less than poorer countries do, although they have more generous social security systems. The political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems. Socialist and French legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries, and the inclusion of legal origin wipes out the effect of the political power of the left. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with a larger unofficial economy, lower labor force participation, and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are difficult to reconcile with efficiency and political power theories of institutional choice, but are broadly consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems. |
主题 | Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging ; Unemployment and Immigration |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9756 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567380 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simeon Djankov,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-de-Silane,et al. The Regulation of Labor. 2003. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w9756.pdf(1215KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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