| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9757 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9757 |
| Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis | |
| Patrick Bajari; Robert S. McMillan; Steve Tadelis | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-06-09 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995-2000. The analysis suggests a number of potential limitations to the use of auctions. Auctions perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, auctions stifle communication between buyers and the sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor's expertise when designing the project. Some implications of these results for procurement in the public sector are discussed. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9757 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567381 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bajari,Robert S. McMillan,Steve Tadelis. Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9757.pdf（1180KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
