| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w9794
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 9794
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| Distributional Disputes and Civil Conflict |
| Herschel I. Grossman
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| 发表日期 | 2003-06-23
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Some polities are able to use constitutionally prescribed political processes to settle distributional disputes, whereas in other polities distributional disputes result in civil conflict. Theoretical analysis reveals that the following properties help to make it possible to design a self-enforcing constitution that can settle recurring distributional disputes between social classes without civil conflict: *Neither social class has a big advantage in civil conflict. *The expected incremental costs of civil conflict are large relative to aggregate appropriable economic rents. *Both social classes are greatly concerned about the future consequences of their current actions. Theoretical analysis also reveals that a self-enforcing constitution can require limitations on the prerogatives of winners of constitutional contests such that on average the distribution of appropriable economic rents under the constitution is not too favorable to one social class or the other and such that the outcome of a constitutional contest does not matter too much for the current distribution of economic rents. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Welfare and Collective Choice
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9794
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567418
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Herschel I. Grossman. Distributional Disputes and Civil Conflict. 2003.
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文件名：
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w9794.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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