| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9813 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9813 |
| Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Jesse M. Fried | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-07-07 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power' approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9813 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567437 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Jesse M. Fried. Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9813.pdf（878KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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