| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9836 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9836 |
| Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions | |
| Ken Hendricks; Robert Porter; Guofu Tan | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-07-14 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding patterns in U.S. federal government offshore oil and gas lease auctions. We show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments. In the latter case, fear of the winner's curse can cause bidders not to bid, which leads to inefficient trade. Buyers with high signals may be better off if no one colludes. The bid data is consistent with oil and gas leases being common value assets, and with the prediction that the winner's curse can prevent rings from forming on marginal tracts. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9836 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567460 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ken Hendricks,Robert Porter,Guofu Tan. Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9836.pdf（549KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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