| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9860 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9860 |
| Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One? | |
| Michael D. Bordo; Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-07-21 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that the size of the public debt, the budget deficit and the monetary overhang made it impossible for France to stabilize its price level and return to the pre-war parity immediately after World War I, even on the anti-keynesian assumption that a stabilization would not have had any negative effects on real income. The reason for the immediate postwar inflation then was not mismanaged policy but a wise choice in the French context. Nevertheless, a stabilization at a devalued franc which would have been substantially higher than the rate achieved by Poincar‚‚ in 1926 was historically possible in early 1924, and it would likely have benefited not only France but the entire international monetary system. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9860 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567485 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael D. Bordo,Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur. Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One?. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9860.pdf（421KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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