| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9871 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9871 |
| Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets: A Simple Model of Learning-By-Doing | |
| Leemore S. Dafny | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-07-28 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the strategic behavior of hospitals in one of their primary output markets: inpatient surgical procedures. High levels of learning-by-doing in surgical fields may act as a barrier to entry. I investigate whether incumbent hospitals facing prospective entry in a procedure market manipulate their procedure volumes to produce such a barrier. I derive straightforward empirical tests from a model of patient demand, procedure quality, and differentiated product competition. Using hospital data on electrophysiological studies, an invasive cardiac procedure, I find evidence of entry-deterring investment in procedure volume. These findings suggest that competitive motivations may play a role in treatment decisions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9871 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567496 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leemore S. Dafny. Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets: A Simple Model of Learning-By-Doing. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9871.pdf（407KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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