| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9949 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9949 |
| Propping and Tunneling | |
| Eric Friedman; Simon Johnson; Todd Mitton | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-09-08 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunnelling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model that explains propping. In particular, we suggest that issuing debt can credibly commit an entrepreneur to propping, even though creditors can never take possession of any underlying collateral. This helps to explain why emerging markets with weak institutions sometimes grow rapidly and why they are also subject to frequent economic and financial crises. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9949 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567574 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric Friedman,Simon Johnson,Todd Mitton. Propping and Tunneling. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9949.pdf（299KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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