| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w9982 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 9982 |
| An Experimental Study of Storable Votes | |
| Alessandra Casella; Andrew Gelman; Thomas R. Palfrey | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-09-22 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the multiple decisions. Voters are induced to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to them most, shifting the ex ante probability of winning away from decisions they value less and towards decisions they value more, typically generating welfare gains over standard majority voting with non-storable votes. The equilibrium strategies have a very intuitive feature---the number of votes cast must be monotonic in the voter's intensity of preferences---but are otherwise difficult to calculate, raising questions of practical implementation. In our experiments, realized efficiency levels were remarkably close to theoretical equilibrium predictions, while subjects adopted monotonic but off-equilibrium strategies. We are lead to conclude that concerns about the complexity of the game may have limited practical relevance. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w9982 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567607 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Andrew Gelman,Thomas R. Palfrey. An Experimental Study of Storable Votes. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w9982.pdf（2445KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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