全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w10017
来源ID	Working Paper 10017
	Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives
	Jason Barro; Nancy Beaulieu
发表日期	2003-10-06
出版年	2003
语种	英语
摘要	In this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w10017
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567641
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jason Barro,Nancy Beaulieu. Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives. 2003.