| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w10093
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 10093
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| Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Corruption |
| Haizhou Huang; Shang-Jin Wei
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| 发表日期 | 2003-11-17
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper examines the role of corruption in the design of monetary policies for developing countries and obtains several interesting results. First, pegged exchange rates, currency boards, or dollarization, while often prescribed as a solution to the problem of a lack-of-credibility for developing countries, is typically not optimal in countries with serious corruption. Second, the optimal degree of conservatism for a Rogoff (1985)-type central banker is an inverse function of the corruption level. Third, either an optimally-designed inflation target or an optimal conservative central banker is preferableto an exchange rate peg, currency board, or dollarization. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Monetary Policy
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10093
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567721
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Haizhou Huang,Shang-Jin Wei. Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Corruption. 2003.
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文件名：
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w10093.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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