| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10097 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10097 |
| How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts? | |
| Steven N. Kaplan; Frederic Martel; Per Stromberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-11-17 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze venture capital (VC) investments in twenty-three non-U.S. countries and compare them to VC investments in the U.S. We describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes. At the same time, however, more experienced VCs implement U.S.-style contracts regardless of legal regime. In most specifications, legal regime becomes insignificant controlling for VC sophistication. VCs who use U.S.-style contracts fail significantly less often. Financial contracting theories in the presence of fixed costs of learning, therefore, appear to explain contracts along a wide range of legal regimes. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10097 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567725 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven N. Kaplan,Frederic Martel,Per Stromberg. How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts?. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10097.pdf（410KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
