| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10101 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10101 |
| Stakeholder, Transparency and Capital Structure | |
| Andres Almazan; Javier Suarez; Sheridan Titman | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-11-17 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about them. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments. The negative effects of transparency can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require external funding and to choose more conservative capital structures that they would otherwise choose. These effects should be especially important for technology firms that require a reputation for being on the leading edge.' |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10101 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567729 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andres Almazan,Javier Suarez,Sheridan Titman. Stakeholder, Transparency and Capital Structure. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10101.pdf（455KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
