| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10104 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10104 |
| Categorical Redistribution in Winner-Take-All Markets | |
| Roland G. Fryer; Glenn C. Loury | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-11-17 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted, where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goals; and category-blind, where they are not. It is shown that the equilibrium category-sighted redistribution scheme involves a constant handicap given to agents in the disadvantaged category. Equilibrium category-blind redistribution creates a unique semi-separating equilibrium in which a large pool of contestants exerts zero effort, and this pool is increasing in the aggressiveness of the redistribution goal. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10104 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567732 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland G. Fryer,Glenn C. Loury. Categorical Redistribution in Winner-Take-All Markets. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10104.pdf（505KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
