全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w10105
来源ID	Working Paper 10105
	Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
	Philip A. Haile; Han Hong; Matthew Shum
发表日期	2003-11-17
出版年	2003
语种	英语
摘要	We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner's curse' arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder's conditional expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations are invariant to the number of opponents each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in the number of opponents. This distinction forms the basis of our tests. We consider both exogenous and endogenous variation in the number of bidders. Monte Carlo experiments show that our tests can perform well in samples of moderate sizes. We apply our tests to two different types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price ( scaled') sales often argued to fit a private values model, our tests consistently fail to find evidence of common values. For lumpsum' sales, where a priori arguments for common values appear stronger, our tests yield mixed evidence against the private values hypothesis.
主题	Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w10105
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567733
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Philip A. Haile,Han Hong,Matthew Shum. Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions. 2003.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w10105.pdf（1130KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览