| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w10140
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 10140
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| The Two-Part Instrument in a Second-Best World |
| Don Fullerton; Ann Wolverton
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| 发表日期 | 2003-12-08
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The standard theory that the first-best tax on pollution is equal to marginal environmental damages has been extended in two directions. First, many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions, and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two-part instrument a tax on one market transaction such as output or income and a subsidy to a different market transaction that is a clean alternative to pollution. It is a generalization of a deposit-refund system. Second, a different literature concerns the second-best optimal pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions. Here, we combine the two extensions by looking at the second-best two-part instrument (2PI). When government needs revenue, is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller? We find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions, and we compare these to the rates in a first-best model. The tax-subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect, an environmental effect, and a revenue effect. The model allows for flexible interpretation, to show various applications of the 2PI. We also discuss important caveats, cases where the 2PI may not be appropriate. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Taxation
; Environmental and Resource Economics
; Renewable Resources
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10140
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567768
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Don Fullerton,Ann Wolverton. The Two-Part Instrument in a Second-Best World. 2003.
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文件名：
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w10140.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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