| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10158 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10158 |
| Governance and Bank Valuation | |
| Gerard Caprio; Luc Laeven; Ross Levine | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-12-15 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Which public policies and ownership structures enhance the governance of banks? This paper constructs a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assesses the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory/regulatory policies on bank valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held, but rather families or the State tend to control banks. We find that (i) larger cash flow rights by the controlling owner boosts valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These results are consistent with the views that expropriation of minority shareholders is important internationally, that laws can restrain this expropriation, and concentrated cash flow rights represent an important mechanism for governing banks. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that empowering official supervisory and regulatory agencies will increase the market valuation of banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10158 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567786 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerard Caprio,Luc Laeven,Ross Levine. Governance and Bank Valuation. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10158.pdf（585KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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