| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10190 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10190 |
| Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-12-29 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms going public have increasingly been incorporating antitakeover provisions in their IPO charters, while shareholders of existing companies have increasingly been voting in opposition to such charter provisions. This paper identifies possible explanations for this empirical pattern. Specifically, I analyze explanations based on (1) the role of antitakeover arrangements in encouraging founders to break up their initial control blocks, (2) efficient private benefits of control, (3) agency problems among pre-IPO shareholders, (4) agency problems between pre-IPO shareholders and their IPO lawyers, (5) asymmetric information between founders and public investors about the firm's future growth prospects, and (6) bounded attention and imperfect pricing at the IPO stage. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10190 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567818 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk. Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10190.pdf（306KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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