全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w10222
来源ID	Working Paper 10222
	Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories
	Paul Oyer; Scott Schaefer
发表日期	2004-01-12
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	Many firms issue stock options to all employees. We consider three potential economic justifications for this practice: providing incentives to employees, inducing employees to sort, and helping firms retain employees. We gather data on firms' stock option grants to middle managers from three distinct sources, and use two methods to assess which theories appear to explain observed granting behavior. First, we directly calibrate models of incentives, sorting and retention, and ask whether observed magnitudes of option grants are consistent with each potential explanation. Second, we conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis of firms' option-granting choices. We reject an incentives-based explanation for broad-based stock option plans, and conclude that sorting and retention explanations appear consistent with the data.
主题	Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w10222
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567850
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Paul Oyer,Scott Schaefer. Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories. 2004.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w10222.pdf（421KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览