| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10240 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10240 |
| Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies | |
| Paul A. Gompers; Joy Ishii; Andrew Metrick | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-01-26 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Dual-class common stock allows for the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights across the different classes of equity. We construct a large sample of dual-class firms in the United States and analyze the relationships of insider's cash flow rights and voting rights with firm value, performance, and investment behavior. We find that relationship of firm value to cash flow rights is positive and concave and the relationship to voting rights is negative and convex. Identical quadratic relationships are found for the respective ownership variables with sales growth, capital expenditures, and the combination of R&D and advertising. Our evidence is consistent with an entrenchment effect of voting control that leads managers to underinvest and an incentive effect of cash flow ownership that induces managers to pursue more aggressive strategies. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10240 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567869 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul A. Gompers,Joy Ishii,Andrew Metrick. Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10240.pdf（319KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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