全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w10363
来源ID	Working Paper 10363
	The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay
	Luis Cabral; Ali Hortacsu
发表日期	2004-03-15
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series of implications and empirically test their validity. Our theoretical model features both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when a seller receives a negative rating for the first time his reputation decreases and so does his effort level. This implies a decline in sales and price; and an increase in the rate of arrival of subsequent negative feedback. Our model also suggests that sellers with worse records are more likely to exit (and possibly re-enter under a new identity), whereas better sellers have more to gain from buying a reputation' by building up a record of favorable feedback through purchases rather than sales. Our empirical evidence, based on a panel data set of seller feedback histories and cross-sectional data on transaction prices collected from eBay is broadly consistent with all of these predictions. An important conclusion of our results is that eBay's reputation system gives way to strategic responses from both buyers and sellers.
主题	Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w10363
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/567992
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Luis Cabral,Ali Hortacsu. The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay. 2004.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w10363.pdf（1354KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览