| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10450 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10450 |
| Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition | |
| Patrick Bajari; C. Lanier Benkard; Jonathan Levin | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-04-26 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, including I.O. models with both discrete and continuous controls such as the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model. We test the algorithm on a class of dynamic discrete choice models with normally distributed errors, and a class of dynamic oligopoly models similar to that of Pakes and McGuire (1994). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Econometrics ; Estimation Methods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10450 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568079 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bajari,C. Lanier Benkard,Jonathan Levin. Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10450.pdf（360KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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