| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10471 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10471 |
| Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives | |
| Mihir A. Desai; Dhammika Dharmapala | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-05-10 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. The model generates the testable hypothesis that firm governance characteristics determine how incentive compensation changes sheltering decisions. In order to test the model, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentive compensation. We find that, for the full sample of firms, increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, suggesting a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. As predicted by the model, the relationship between incentive compensation and tax sheltering is a function of a firm's corporate governance. Our results may help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the undersheltering puzzle,' and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10471 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568100 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mihir A. Desai,Dhammika Dharmapala. Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10471.pdf（329KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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