| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w10494
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 10494
|
| Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess? |
| Raghuram Rajan; Julie Wulf
|
| 发表日期 | 2004-05-17
|
| 出版年 | 2004
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | A widespread view is that executive perks exemplify agency problems -- they are a route through which managers misappropriate a firm’s surplus. Accordingly, firms with high free cash flow, operating in industries with limited investment prospects, should offer more perks, and firms subject to more external monitoring should offer fewer perks. The evidence for agency as an explanation of perks is, at best, mixed. Perks are, however, offered in situations in which they enhance managerial productivity. While we cannot rule out the occasional aberration, and while we have little to say on the overall level of perks, our findings suggest that treating perks purely as managerial excess is incorrect. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Corporate Finance
; Labor Economics
; Labor Compensation
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10494
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568123
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Raghuram Rajan,Julie Wulf. Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?. 2004.
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|
文件名：
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w10494.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
|
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