| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10543 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10543 |
| Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions: Evidence from Sponsored Pension Plans | |
| Daniel Bergstresser; Mihir A. Desai; Joshua Rauh | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-06-07 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings when they characterize pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. We construct a measure of the sensitivity of reported earnings to the assumed long-term rate of return on pension assets. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Managers also increase assumed rates of return as they prepare to acquire other firms and as they exercise stock options, further confirming the opportunistic nature of these increases. Decisions about assumed rates of return, in turn, influence asset allocation within pension plans. Instrumental variables results suggest that a 25 basis point increase in the assumed rate of return is associated with a 5% increase in equity allocation. Taken together, these results suggest that earnings manipulation arising from managerial motivations influences significant managerial investment decisions. |
| 主题 | Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10543 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568172 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Bergstresser,Mihir A. Desai,Joshua Rauh. Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions: Evidence from Sponsored Pension Plans. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10543.pdf（405KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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