| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10567 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10567 |
| SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information, and the Cost of Capital | |
| Armando Gomes; Gary Gorton; Leonardo Madureira | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-06-21 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure ( Reg FD') by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the practice of selective disclosure,' in which companies give material information only to a few analysts and institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly. We find that the adoption of Reg FD caused a significant reallocation of information-producing resources, resulting in a welfare loss for small firms, which now face a higher cost of capital. The loss of the selective disclosure' channel for information flows could not be compensated for via other information transmission channels. This effect was more pronounced for firms communicating complex information and, consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, for those losing analyst coverage. Moreover, we find no significant relationship of the different responses with litigation risks and agency costs. Our results suggest that Reg FD had unintended consequences and that information' in financial markets may be more complicated than current finance theory admits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10567 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568196 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Armando Gomes,Gary Gorton,Leonardo Madureira. SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information, and the Cost of Capital. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10567.pdf（763KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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