| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10601 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10601 |
| Peace and War in Territorial Disputes | |
| Herschel I. Grossman | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-07-05 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why do sovereign states sometimes fail to settle territorial disputes peacefully? Also, why do even peaceful settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to be unfortified? This paper explores a class of answers to these questions that is based on the following premise: States can settle a territorial dispute peacefully only if (1) their payoffs from a peaceful settlement are larger than their expected payoffs from a default to war, and (2) their promises not to attack are credible. This premise directs the analysis to such factors as the advantage of attacking over both defending and counterattacking, the divisibility of the contested territory, the possibility of recurring war, the depreciation or obsolescence of fortifications, and inequality in the effectiveness of mobilized resources. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10601 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568230 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Herschel I. Grossman. Peace and War in Territorial Disputes. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10601.pdf（482KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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