全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w10609
来源ID	Working Paper 10609
	How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy
	John A. List; Daniel M. Sturm
发表日期	2004-07-05
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	In this paper we explore to what extent secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral incentives. We develop a political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue, such as the level of public spending, and a secondary policy issue, such as environmental policy. The model shows under which conditions the incumbent finds it worthwhile to manipulate the secondary policy to attract additional votes to his platform. We test the predictions of the model using state-level panel data on Gubernatorial environmental policy choices over the years 1960-2000. In contrast to the popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives on environmental policy.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Subnational Fiscal Issues
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w10609
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568238
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	John A. List,Daniel M. Sturm. How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy. 2004.