| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10612 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10612 |
| Targeting vs. Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy | |
| Bennett T. McCallum; Edward Nelson | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Svensson (JEL, 2003) argues strongly that specific targeting rules first order optimality conditions for a specific objective function and model are normatively superior to instrument rules for the conduct of monetary policy. That argument is based largely upon four main objections to the latter plus a claim concerning the relative interest-instrument variability entailed by the two approaches. The present paper considers the four objections in turn, and advances arguments that contradict all of them. Then in the paper's analytical sections, it is demonstrated that the variability claim is incorrect, for a neo-canonical model and also for a variant with one-period-ahead plans used by Svensson, providing that the same decision-making errors are relevant under the two alternative approaches. Arguments relating to general targeting rules and actual central bank practice are also included. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10612 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568243 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bennett T. McCallum,Edward Nelson. Targeting vs. Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10612.pdf（309KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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