| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10742 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10742 |
| Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Jesse M. Fried | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-06 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes an important form of "stealth compensation" provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. Our study also highlights the significance of whether information about compensation arrangements is not merely publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10742 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568374 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Jesse M. Fried. Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10742.pdf（235KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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