| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10748 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10748 |
| Why Do Incumbent Senators Win? Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model | |
| Gautam Gowrisankaran; Matthew F. Mitchell; Andrea Moro | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-06 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Since 1914, incumbent U.S. senators running for reelection have won almost 80% of the time. We investigate why incumbents win so often. We allow for three potential explanations for the incumbency advantage: selection, tenure, and challenger quality, which are separately identified using histories of election outcomes following an open seat election. We specify a dynamic model of voter behavior that allows for these three effects, and structurally estimate the parameters of the model using U.S. Senate data. We find that tenure effects are negative or small. We also find that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats. If incumbents faced challengers as strong as candidates for open seats, the incumbency advantage would be cut in half. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Econometrics ; Estimation Methods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10748 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568380 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gautam Gowrisankaran,Matthew F. Mitchell,Andrea Moro. Why Do Incumbent Senators Win? Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10748.pdf（305KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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