| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10758 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10758 |
| Patent Licensing and the Research University | |
| Richard A. Jensen; Marie C. Thursby | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-09-13 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct a dynamic model of university research that allows us to examine recent concerns that financial incentives associated with university patent licensing are detrimental to the traditional mission of US research universities. We assume a principal-agent framework in which the university administration is the principal and a faculty researcher is the agent. Whether or not the researcher remains in the university, and if so her choice of the amount of time to spend on basic and applied research, is complicated by the fact that she earns license income and prestige both inside and outside the university. Thus in contrast to usual principal agent models the participation constraint is endogenous. This, plus the fact that current research affects future knowledge stocks, allows us to show that it is far from obvious that licensing will damage basic research and education. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Industrial Organization ; Nonprofits ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10758 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568390 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard A. Jensen,Marie C. Thursby. Patent Licensing and the Research University. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10758.pdf（725KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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