| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w10760
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 10760
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| Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky
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| 发表日期 | 2004-09-13
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| 出版年 | 2004
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a costly audit. I derive the optimal fine for the underlying offense, the optimal fine for misrepresenting one's wealth level, and the optimal audit probability. I demonstrate that the optimal fine for misrepresenting wealth equals the fine for the offense divided by the audit probability, and therefore generally exceeds the fine for the offense. The optimal audit probability is positive, increases as the cost of an audit declines, and equals unity if the cost is sufficiently low. If the optimal audit probability is less than unity, there are some individuals who are capable of paying the fine for the offense who misrepresent their wealth levels. I also show that the optimal fine for the offense results in underdeterrence due to the cost of auditing wealth levels. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10760
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568392
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
A. Mitchell Polinsky. Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe. 2004.
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文件名：
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w10760.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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