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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/t0301
来源IDTechnical Working Paper 0301
Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information
Patrick Bajari; Han Hong; Stephen Ryan
发表日期2004-10-04
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. With appropriate exclusion restrictions about how covariates enter into payoffs and influence equilibrium selection, the model is identified with only weak parametric assumptions. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples. As an application, we study the strategic decision of firms in spatially-separated markets to establish a presence on the Internet.
主题Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/t0301
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568434
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Patrick Bajari,Han Hong,Stephen Ryan. Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information. 2004.
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