| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10807 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10807 |
| CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment | |
| Ulrike Malmendier; Geoffrey Tate | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-10-04 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company-specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10807 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568440 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ulrike Malmendier,Geoffrey Tate. CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10807.pdf（578KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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