| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10826 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10826 |
| Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting | |
| Pravin Krishna; Devashish Mitra | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-10-11 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other. Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10826 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568459 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pravin Krishna,Devashish Mitra. Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Reforms with Majority Voting. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10826.pdf（162KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
