| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10836 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10836 |
| Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons | |
| Brian R. Copeland; M. Scott Taylor | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-10-11 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which countries escape the tragedy of the commons is endogenously determined and explicitly linked to changes in world prices and other possible effects of market integration. We show how changes in world prices can move some countries from de facto open access situations to ones where management replicates that of an unconstrained social planner. Not all countries can follow this path of institutional reform and we identify key country characteristics (mortality rates, resource growth rates, technology) to divide the world's set of resource rich countries into Hardin, Ostrom and Clark economies. Hardin economies are not able to manage their renewable resources at any world price, have zero rents and suffer from the tragedy of the commons. Ostrom economies exhibit de facto open access and zero rents for low resource prices, but can maintain a limited form of resource management at higher prices. Clark economies can implement fully efficient management and do so when resource prices are sufficiently high. The model shows heterogeneity in the success of resource management is to be expected, and neutral technological progress works to undermine the efficacy of property rights institutions. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Renewable Resources |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10836 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568469 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Brian R. Copeland,M. Scott Taylor. Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10836.pdf（716KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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