| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10891 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10891 |
| Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design | |
| Peter M. DeMarzo; Ilan Kremer; Andrzej Skrzypacz | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-11-08 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold. Such auctions are commonly used, both formally and informally. In formal auctions, the seller restricts bids to an ordered set, such as an equity share or royalty rate, and commits to a format, such as first or second-price. In informal settings with competing buyers, the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront. Rather, bidders offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid, based on his beliefs, ex-post. We characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies for formal and informal auctions. For formal auctions, we examine the impact of both the security design and the auction format. We define a notion of the steepness of a set of securities, and show that steeper securities lead to higher revenues. We also show that the revenue equivalence principle holds for equity and cash auctions, but that it fails for debt (second-price auctions are superior) and for options (a first-price auction yields higher revenues). We then show that an informal auction yields the lowest possible revenues across all possible formal mechanisms. Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the effects of liquidity constraints, different information assumptions, and aspects of moral hazard. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10891 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568526 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter M. DeMarzo,Ilan Kremer,Andrzej Skrzypacz. Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10891.pdf（329KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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