全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w10943
来源ID	Working Paper 10943
	Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation
	Xinyu Hua; Kathryn E. Spier
发表日期	2004-12-06
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppose a long-lived plaintiff is suing a defendant for damages sustained in an accident. The plaintiff may suffer similar damages in future accidents involving different defendants. Potential injurers update their beliefs after observing the first case and subsequently fine-tune their precautions to avoid accidents. The joint incentive of the plaintiff and the first defendant to create public information through litigation is too small. The optimal liability rule trades off providing future injurers with incentives to take precautions and providing the plaintiff with incentives to create information.
主题	Other ; Law and Economics ; Microeconomics ; Economics of Information
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w10943
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568578
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Xinyu Hua,Kathryn E. Spier. Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation. 2004.